We Remember Captain Mike Goodwin

Philadelphia Fire Department Ladder 27 was dispatched as the Rapid Intervention Team also known as RIT to a structure fire at 748 South 4th Street in Philadelphia, PA on the evening of April 6, 2013. The fire began in the basement of a fabric store which had extended to the upper floors of the three story store front structure with apartments above. 

Captain Mike Goodwin was the officer in charge of Ladder 27 for the shift. Upon arrival, Ladder 27 RIT company staged their equipment near the command post and the IC (Incident Commander) assigned them to the roof of an adjacent structure to perform ventilation operations. It was at this time, Captain Goodwin reported to command there was heavy smoke conditions coming from the exposure they were shortly going to be operating on. Donned in full PPE w, Captain Goodwin fell 20 feet onto the roof of the building and shortly after fell through the roof into the fire building. 

Firefighters on scene reported this fall to the IC and rescue operations were quickly put into place in attempts to rescue Captain Goodwin. Due to limited access to the roof area and fire conditions, access was limited. During rescue efforts, firefighters breached an exterior brick wall to gain access to his location where he was removed from the structure and transported to the hospital. Additionally, Firefighter Andrew Godlinski was injured while attempting to rescue Captain Goodwin following the collapse before a second floor roof and two walls collapsed.

Captain Mike Goodwin of Ladder 27 was pronounced dead at the hospital due to what was listed as multiple blunt force injuries. He was posthumously promoted to Battalion Chief. 

Captain Goodwin is survived by his wife and two children. 

We Remember…

Captain Mike Goodwin, age 53, Philadelphia Fire Department, Ladder 27

Remembering Firefighter John A. Nicosia - Paterson Fire Department (NJ)

It was approximately 05:54am on January 17, 1991, when the City of Paterson Fire Department (NJ) responded to a structure fire at Underground II clothing store at 161 Main Street, which was formerly the Meyer Brothers Department Store. Due to strong winds, fire rapidly spread through the stores on that city block. Firefighter John A. Nicosia of Engine 4 entered the structure with his crew to begin hose advancement and fire suppression, but failed to exit with them when they were driven out by high heat and smoke. 

According to the United States Fire Association, "the fire spread to a second building and there was a minor blow-out of windows and a large ball of fire". 

When roll call and head count was taken after the evacuation it was determined that Firefighter Nicosia was missing. Crews immediately began searching for the missing firefighter and it wasn't until they found Firefighter Nicosia's body two days later in the basement of the initial structure. 

Firefighter John Nicosia passed away from asphyxiation after being trapped in the basement.  

The line of duty death brought important safety changes to the City of Paterson Fire Department such as the implementation of nylon hose lines, Nomex hoods, a name tag and a PASS device for all firefighters. 

We Remember…

Firefighter John A. Nicosia, age 29, Paterson Fire Department

Remembering Captain Jeff Bowen - Asheville Fire Department

Captain Jeff Bowen was among one of the first firefighters to arrive on scene of the fire at the medical office building on Biltmore Avenue in Asheville, NC on July 28, 2011 when things went horrifically wrong.

The Structure

It was a 122,862-square foot, six story commercial structure, containing numerous medical offices and built in 1982. It consisted of six floors - a ground floor with five upper floors and a basement. The exterior was cast concrete panels reinforced by steel columns and I-beams and large glass window panes throughout. The roof construction was a flat roof of corrugated steel decking finished with a rubber membrane, asphalt and about an inch thick layer of gravel on top. The parapet wall was approximately 3 feet high off the roof with a mechanical room made of concrete housing the utilities in the center of the roof.

Interior of the structure was drywall over metal studs - numerous rooms and long hallways throughout and poured concrete floors covered in carpet and some tiled. The ceilings were suspended acoustic tiles supported by a metal grid (drop ceiling) with a 3 foot void space between the drop ceiling and the steel decking of the floor above. This was where the heat and cooling ductwork along with other utilities were located.

The structure was equipped with an automatic fire alarm system however the system had false alarms five times within the last 30 days. The only sprinklered room was on the second floor (Division 2) which contained a hyperbaric chamber.

The Incident

At 1228 hours, four companies were dispatched to an automatic fire alarm of a multistory medical building - 2 engines, 1 truck and a squad company. Upon arrival, Engine 2 reported a working fire with heavy smoke and fire showing on the top floor rear of the structure and dispatched a second alarm.

Rather than a second alarm being dispatched, a Division Chief, Battalion Chief, Safety Officer, Engine Company, Rescue Company and Fire Marshall were dispatched as an additional first alarm.

Firefighters from Engine 2 connected 100 feet of 2 ½-inch hoseline to the standpipe in the stairwell of the top floor of the medical building. Shortly after flowing water Engine 2 exited the structure after low air alarms began to go off and fire suppression was picked up by Rescue 3 however issues with getting water to flow came into play. At this time, heavy smoke began to flow through the top two floors and north of the stairwell and by this time low air alarms began to go off on firefighters of Rescue 3 causing them to begin exiting the structure. There was no sprinkler system to help calm the heavy fire situation on the top floor.

It was at this time that Captain Jeff Bowen of Rescue 3 went down the hallway followed by 2 of the firefighters while the remaining 2 firefighters exited the structure. When the two firefighters and Captain Bowen reached the hallway connected to the fire rooms, their low air alarms began to sound and it was at this moment one of them noticed Captain Bowen acting confused and started heading back into the stairwell where one firefighter grabbed Captain Bowen. They were then separated in heavy smoke and began making their way towards the fire room. One of the firefighters made it to a window where Ladder 1 had their aerial device set up just before running out of air.

Captain Bowen ran out of air and notified his partner they would need to begin buddy breathing off their SCBAs and transmitted a Mayday and activated his PASS device. The firefighter also transmitted several Maydays and attempted to activate his PASS before removing his facepiece to look for an escape route. Bowen also removed his facepiece due to vomiting in it. The firefighter began looking for a new escape route by crawling down a hallway attempting to open several doors until he found the south stairwell, placing his tool in the door and heading back to Captain Bowen. He pulled Captain Bowen into the south stairwell where he then collapsed and both firefighters fell down a flight of stairs. They were located by another firefighter who was exiting the building and heard their PASS alarms going off. Both firefighters were transported to the hospital where Captain Bowen passed away due to his injuries.

It was determined during the fire investigation that this was an arson fire.

Contributing Factors as per NIOSH

• Arson

• Lack of an automatic fire suppression system

• Multistory/high-rise standard operating procedures not followed

• Air management doctrine not followed

• Reverse stack effect in stairwell

• Inadequate strategy and tactics

• Task saturation of the incident commander

We Remember…

Captain Jeff Bowen, 37, a 13-year veteran of the fire service - Asheville Fire Dept., Rescue 3

NFFF IC-to-IC Discussion – Medical Office Building Fire - YouTube

Remembering the West Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion

It was a typical spring evening with temperature s around 80 degrees on the evening of April 17, 2013 in central Texas. Humidity that evening was low with scattered clouds and 20 mile per hour winds blowing in from the south south east (SSE).

At around 7:30 that evening in the City of West, an explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company plant. An explosion so powered it registered as a 2.1 magnitude earthquake and felt over 80 miles away damaging many homes and school throughout the area. 

At this time, dispatched received a 911 call reporting smoke coming from the West Fertilizer Company plant and at 7:34 PM, the West Volunteer Fire Department was dispatched to the scene with two engines, a brush trick and tender responding to the scene along with two more firefighters arriving in their personal vehicles. The first arriving unit on scene was at approximately 7:39 PM confirming a structure fire at the plant and deployed an initial attack line (1 1/2 attack line) to extinguish any and all visible fire and to establish a water supply using a 4-inch diameter supply line. Please note, the nearest fire hydrant was more than a quarter mile away from the scene. An initial mutual aid alarm was struck with included an aerial ladder truck and four more firefighters which responded in their personal vehicles.  

Within 12 minutes of the initial arriving unit on scene and 22 minutes from the initial 911 dispatch, an explosion occurred at the plant leaving multiple firefighters down.

Ten first responders were killed in this explosion due to an estimated 40 to 60 tons of ammonium nitrate exploding just outside the city limits.

Five firefighters from the West Volunteer Fire Department were killed in the explosion along with four firefighters from 3 neighboring departments along with one off-duty career fire captain and two civilians who offered assistance to the fire department on scene. 

Factors of the incident

The department did not recognize the hazards associated with the ammonium nitrate

• There was limited pre-planning of the facility

• Rapid fire spread in wood construction commercial structure with no sprinkler system

Post incident recommendations as per NIOSH

Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning of buildings within their jurisdiction to facilitate the development of safe fireground strategies and tactics especially in high hazard high risk structures

• Fire departments should have a written management plan, use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially at incidents with high risk hazards

• Fire departments should implement and enforce the Incident Management System (IMS) at all emergency operations

• Fire departments should ensure all firefighters wear personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned tasks

• Fire departments should ensure all firefighters are training to the standards that meet or exceed NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications

 We remember:

Firefighter Morris Bridges

Firefighter Cody Dragoo

Firefighter Joseph Pustejovsky

Firefighter Douglas Snokhous

Firefighter Robert Snokhous

Firefighter Jerry Dane Chapman

Firefighter Cyrus Reed

Firefighter Kevin Saunders

Fire Captain Harris Kenneth

Firefighter Perry Calvin

Remembering March 25th A Day of Disaster

March 25th: A day of disaster

March 25th is an essential date in fire history. On this date in 1911 was "The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire" and 79 years later, "The Happy Land Social Club Fire."

Two of the most deadly fires occurred on this date, both in New York City.

TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE

One hundred forty-six young female immigrants perished in the act of negligence. The fire, which broke out on March 25th, 1911, just before 4 pm, was believed to of started in a bin filled with scraps of rags and fabrics by a discarded cigarette. The Triangle Factory occupied the top three floors of the Asch Building, located at the corner of Greene Street and Washington Place in Manhattan, NY. The working areas were cramped and consisted of nearly 600 young women working at the time. The building did have four elevators; however, only one was working at the time of the fire. There were usually buckets of water throughout the factory in case of a fire; however, Mary Domsky-Abrams, an employee of the building, stated that the buckets were empty that day.  

When the fire broke out, one of the managers attempted to extinguish the fire. Panic began to set in once the extinguishment was proven unsuccessful. Workers tried to flee the building, but as mentioned, only one working elevator slowed that down and eventually, the elevator was compromised due to the heat from the fire. Although many employees and managers could escape to the rooftop and flee to adjoining buildings, many young women were met with horrible deaths. Upon arrival, the fire department witnessed employees jumping out of windows, falling to their death. Many employees also decided to jump to their deaths in the elevator shaft, and others burned alive when they came across a locked door.

There was strong evidence of negligence against Max Blanckand Isaac Harris, who owned the Triangle Factory. Despite the evidence, a grand jury failed to indict them of manslaughter. Although too late for the 146 victims of this fire, politicians united to ensure there were rights for factory workers. New York State Legislators created the Factory Investigating Commission, which inspected working conditions in garment factories, chemical factories, and meat packing warehouses.

HAPPY LAND SOCIAL CLUB

Exactly seventy-nine years later, on March 25th, 1990, Julio Gonzalez argued with his girlfriend, which led him to set fire to the social club. Located in the Bronx, NY, The Happy Land Social Club was a popular weekend hangout, often crowded all night.

At approximately 3 am, a bouncer removed Julio Gonzalez from the social club after arguing with his girlfriend, an employee at the nightclub. Gonzalez arrived back at the nightclub at approximately 3:30 am with gasoline. When he returned, he found the stairwell with the only exit and soaked it with gasoline before throwing two matches and going home. Killing 87 people; this was the most deadly fire since 1911. Sixteen months before the fire, the social club was ordered to close due to building code infractions. Happy Land had no fire alarms, the emergency exits, or lack thereof, were blocked by roll-down security gates, and there were no sprinklers. Due to this, some victims were trampled due to a cluster of people in certain areas. Most of the victims perished due to smoke inhalation. Only six people escaped the fire. Among them was Julio Gonzalezs' girlfriend, Lydia Feliciano. She advised the police of her and Julio's argument, which led them to his home, where he confessed to the arson.

Julio Gonzalez was charged with 174 counts of murder, two for each victim, and was found guilty on 87 counts of arson and 87 counts of murder. He was sentenced to 25 years to life; he died in 2016. Immediately following the fire, the New York City Department of Buildings began a crackdown on illegal nightclubs. Laws exist for sprinkler systems, access points, occupancy limits, and emergency exits.

The following links contain first-hand info on the incidents mentioned, including an interview with Ruben Valladares, a DJ at Happy Land. For more information, I encourage you to search for the events online. There are multiple resources packed with in-depth information on the incidents.

Triangle Factory - https://www.history.com/news/triangle-shirtwaist-factory-fire-labor-safety-laws

Happy Land - https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/nyregion/happy-land-fire-bronx.html

Work Hard - Stay Safe - Live Inspired

Remembering the Bricelyn Street Fre

It was shortly after midnight on February 14,1995, Valentine's Day where three Pittsburgh firefighters tragically died in the line-of-duty at 8361 Bricelyn Street. This was a fire the fire service and the community would never forget.

The House

8361 Bricelyn Street home sat top of sloped hill in the densely populated residential area of the city causing the front entrance to actually be on the second floor level. The front view of the home only appeared to have two stories while the basement was exposed above grade level and the house now appeared to be equivalent to a four story home. In reality, the first floor was one level above the backyard and one level below the front door.

The home was a single family dwelling that stood approximately 20 feet wide and 33 feet deep and three occupied floors above the partially finished basement.  The interior walls of the residency was made of plaster and lath and the exterior had aluminum siding over asphalt shingles attached to balloon frame construction. The density of the area posed significant exterior exposure problems with the neighboring house to the left was only 27 inches from the incident and the right side was a 12 foot wide yard between the homes. 

The Incident

Engine Company 17 responded to 8361 Bricelyn Street for the reported residential structure fire and were assigned to fire suppression in the basement division of a reported arson fire.  While operating in the basement on the hose line, three firefighters became separated from the other crews after the stairwell collapsed causing the firefighters to become trapped and disoriented in the basement. The three firefighters later died of asphyxiation after running out of air. When found, all three of the firefighters were together in the one room with three other firefighters being rescued from the same room. This caused confusion over the status of the initial attack team.

The Aftermath - Pittsburgh Drill

The fire on Bricelyn Street exposed the fire service for the need to develop rapid intervention team training. At the time, Assistant Chief James Crawford, was a firefighter in Pittsburgh and a member of the RIT assigned to attempt the rescue of the three firefighters. Crawford discusses the difficulty in dragging, pulling and lifting the firefighters from the structure, saying he himself barely made it out during the operation.

Following the incident, Crawford developed a formal RIT program that has spread through the county and is part of the RIC training today which is now known as "The Pittsburgh Drill". The three main concepts of this drill are based on the Bricelyn Street fire: low profile (under), ramp type obstacle (over) and a tunnel (through).

The drill itself requires the four-member crew to work in sync in an order to reach a downed firefighter, package for removal and remove the firefighter through the same manner the crew entered. All of this to be completed in 20 minutes or less. 

The drill emphasizes key areas from that incident such as teamwork, communication, effective use of time and critical thinking.

 May we remember and never forget…

Captain Thomas Brooks - father of two children and a 13-year department veteran

Firefighter Patricia Conroy - first female LODD in the departments history

Firefighter Marc Kolenda - second-generation Pittsburgh firefighter. Engaged to be married

NIOSH Report: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484126

Pittsburgh Drill: https://youtu.be/2IUE8CFob7k

Remembering the Bricelyn Street Fire: https://fb.watch/iHqd9rlqa4/?mibextid=v7YzmG

We Remember: Black Sunday FDNY

January 23rd, 2005.  One of the darkest days in FDNY history. A day the department lost multiple firefighters in two different incidents. Known to first responders worldwide as "Black Sunday."

Bronx: While performing a search during a three-alarm fire, Lieutenant John Bellew of Ladder 27, firefighter Joseph DiBernardo of Rescue 3, and  Lieutenant Curtis Meyran of Battalion 26 became trapped on the fourth floor of a four-story apartment. Due to the increased heat and fire, all three firefighters were forced to jump from the window to the ground. The apartment building was an older building from the late 1920s. The apartments involved were made into single-room occupancies (SRO). Each shares a common bathroom and kitchen. According to the NIOSH report, each SRO had a padlock on the bedroom doors. There was also limited access at the rear fire escape due to a partition with wood framing and sheetrock. In addition, there were no permits issued for construction in the building, and there were also no automatic sprinklers making the construction project a violation of local building codes. In addition to the three firefighters mentioned earlier, Brendan Cawley, Jeff Cool, and Gene Stolowski were severely injured in the jump. Later that day, Lieutenants John Bellew and Curtis Meyran succumbed to their injuries. Firefighter DiBernardo was promoted to Lieutenant in the spring of 2005. Unfortunately, Lt. DiBernardo passed away in 2011 due to complications with injuries sustained on January 23rd, 2005.

Brooklyn: Sometime just before 2 pm that same day, FDNY units were dispatched to a basement fire in a private dwelling. One of the first arriving units was Ladder Company 103. Part of the crew was firefighter Richard Sclafani who was assigned to search the basement. Due to fire conditions changing, firefighter Sclafani became separated from his company during the search. Minutes after being separated, Sclafani was located unconscious and in respiratory arrest. The NIOSH report stated firefighters worked on removing him from the building for 20 minutes. Firefighter Sclafani succumbed to his injuries, and the official cause of death was smoke inhalation and burns. January 23rd, 2005 marked the first time since 1918 that the FDNY lost firefighters in separate incidents.

Following the incident, the FDNY completed its internal investigation, and personal escape systems were purchased for all firefighters. Had the systems been available to the firefighters on Black Sunday, it would have saved the lives of Lieutenants Bellew, DiBernardo, and Meyran and prevented injuries to firefighters Cawley, Cool, and Stolowski. Black Sunday is a day that will be remembered forever in fire history. There is plenty of material on multiple sites providing information. I encourage new and veteran firefighters to remain educated on this day and learn from it.

In 2013, the Lt. Joseph P. DiBernardo Memorial Foundation, also known as the Joey D Foundation, was started to help train and equip firefighters in need. I have personally attended the yearly seminar they hold on Long Island. The training weekend is filled with two days of hands-on training followed by a day of great lectures. World-class instructors and firefighters teach all classes and lessons. The foundation raises money to provide fire departments with funding for personal escape systems, helping ensure an incident such as "Black Sunday" doesn't happen again.

NIOSH report for the Bronx fire

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200503.html

NIOSH report for the Brooklyn fire

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200504.html

Photos from firerescue1.com

Remembering the Maverick Square Fire, Boston, Mass.

In the early morning hours of November 15, 1942, a fire broke out in Luongo's Tap, a restaurant within the former East Boston Lyceum, which quickly escalated to three alarms. The temperature that evening was 12 degrees Fahrenheit with stiff winds. During the incident, the brick wall from the third through fifth floors on the Henry Street side of building collapsed without warning, trapping many firefighters under the rubble. The Boston Fire Departments only white-colored apparatus, Ladder 8, a 125 foot aerial truck was also buried under the rubble.

The Building & Incident

The fire took place in a  five and a half story brick building which housed a liquor store on the first floor and a tavern and restaurant on the first floor and above with the second floor housing a dine and dance café. The fire originated in the ceiling above the first floor kitchen and from there extended throughout the entire building along with an adjourning 3-story building (20ft x 40ft brick building) located on Henry Street. 

The Boston fire Department transmitted a still alarm at 0226 hours for Engine Co. 40 and Ladder Co. 2 to respond to the location. Box 6153 was then transmitted at 0227 hours for Engine Co. 9, Engine Co. 5, Engine Co. 11, Ladder Co. 31 and Acting District chief Jacob Berninger of District 1 to respond on a full first alarm assignment.

At 0305 hours a second alarm was transmitted followed by a third alarm at 0324 hours by District Chief Crowley and Deputy Chief Stickel, respectively. At approximately 0400 hours and without warning the brick wall collapsed on the Henry Street side of the building. Prior to the collapse, it was said to have shown no signs of buckling. Rescue operations began immediately and a fourth alarm was struck at 0420 hours followed by a fifth alarm at 0434 hours by the Chief of the Department Samuel Pope.

In the end, nearly fifty Boston firefighters were injured or trapped in the collapse with six firefighters passing away due to their injuries. The six firefighters who perished in the line of duty that day equaled the record number of Boston Firefighters who died in the line of duty during the Merrimac Street Fire and Collapse of 1898.

We Remember…

Hoseman John F. Foley - Engine Co. 3 Hoseman Edward F. Macomber - Engine Co. 12 Ladderman Daniel E. McGuire - Ladder Co. 2 Hoseman Peter F. McMorrow - Engine Co. 50 Hoseman Malachi F. Reddington - Engine Co. 33 Hoseman Francis J. Degan - Engine Co. 3

Remembering Firefighter Mark Langvardt

On September 28, 1992 Denver Fire Department responded to a reported structure fire in a two story commercial occupancy at 0207 hours. Heavy smoke was billowing from the structure with no visible fire showing. As firefighter made entry, they were hit with high heat and extreme smoke with multiple fires in remote rooms across the structure. Engineer Mark Langvardt of Truck 16 was performing truck operations on the second floor when he became separated from his partner. Due to a partial floor collapse of the second floor, Langvardt found himself in a 6' x 11' room filled with filing cabinets and other office equipment with an aisle only 28 inches wide. The room had only one window that was 2o inches wide and a sill height of 42 inches off the ground and covered by a security grate. Engineer Langvardt was trapped and low on air. His ability to break a small hole in the window alerted the incident commander a firefighter was in trouble on the second floor. 

Shortly thereafter, a second alarm was transmitted and a rescue operation was initiated. While firefighters attempted to remove Engineer Langvardt from the window, a second crew was working to breach an interior wall in hopes to remove Mark. Due to the narrow space, height of the sill and weight of Mark in full bunker gear, firefighters were unable to remove Mark through the window. After a 55 minute operation, firefighters were able to gain access through the interior wall and remove Mark from the structure. Engineer Langvardt died from his injuries due to smoke inhalation.

Many lessons were learned from this tragic death and from this was the "Denver Drill" which is now taught around the country for rapid intervention and firefighter rescues. The fire was said to be arson and the arsonist was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

May Engineer Mark Langvardt, Truck 16 of the Denver Fire Department rest in peace.

Remembering the Deutsche Bank Fire

On August 18, 2007 a fire broke out at the former Deutsche Bank which was directly across the street from FDNY Engine 10 and Ladder 10 Firehouse. Otherwise known as the Ten House around 3:40 in the afternoon. The fire began on the 17th floor of the New York City building and soon thereafter became a seven alarm fire, was currently under demolition as it is at the site of the World Trade Center.

The building which originally stood at 41 stories was reduced to 26 stories after demolition crews removed the upper floors. At the time the fire broke out, the crews working on the demolition were in the process of removing asbestos. The fire was caused by a workers careless smoking which is in violation of the building's safety rules. The fire spread throughout the floor and affected ten floors of the remaining structure. Due to the work taking place in the building, protective polyethylene sheets which are made to prevent the spread of asbestos was draped throughout the floors, causing the floors to become a make shift maze for firefighters. The other danger these sheets present to firefighters is the buildup of smoke being trapped within these sheets. Further, since this building was under demolition, there was no functioning standpipe system for fire suppression crews to work off. This forced firefighters to raise hand lines from the street to combat the fire.

The building was not inspected since March of 2007 and was required to be inspected every 15 days. The seven alarm fire burned into the evening hours before being extinguished. There was an estimated 45 engine companies, 30 ladder companies, 3 rescue companies, 19 battalion chiefs, 4 deputy chiefs and numerous staff on scene.

115 firefighters were injured with 46 needing required medical attention. Two firefighters lost their lives this day on the 14th floor from smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning.

May we always remember,

Firefighter Joseph Graffagnino - FDNY Ladder 5

Firefighter Robert Beddia - FDNY Engine 24 

May they rest in peace.

Remembering the Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire

The incident

At 8:39 a.m. on August 2, 1978 four FDNY companies and 1 battalion chief was dispatched to the Waldbaum's Supermarket on 2892 Ocean Avenue and Avenue Y in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn for a reported fire. Engine 254 entered through the front door and began advancing hose to the mezzanine section of store while additional firefighters were sent to the roof to for ventilation.  At this time, only light smoke was in the building. Within 10 minutes at 8:49 a.m. an "all hands" signal was sent out as Engine 276 arrived and reported fire in the walls of the second-story extension that was still under construction. The initial engine on scene (E254), began fire suppression in the mezzanine ceiling where they reported high heat and little smoke.

Shortly thereafter, a second alarm was sent out and three ladder companies (169, 153 and 156) were on the roof making cuts through the bowed rain roof which sat near the center of the building. These companies found very little smoke and did not realize the fire was under the main roof of the structure. Ladder companies 169, 153 and 156 then began to make cuts near the edges of the building which was found to  vent great deals of smoke. Interior firefighters at this time were working to pull the drop ceiling to gain access for the roof firefighters to put water onto the fire they could see from the roof.

At 9:16 a.m. a loud noise from inside the structure rang out and a wooden roof strut had collapsed. With 24 firefighters on the roof, it was reported the roof collapsed without a sound. Six of the firefighters fell onto the tin ceiling and managed to escape the structure. All of the firefighters survived although some with serious injuries.

With more smoke inside and outside of the structure, a third alarm was sent out. Firefighters were still working on the roof, rushed to the edges of the building for safety. As conditions began to worsen inside, firefighters were now searching for survivors of the roof collapse and by this point Chief James O'Malley had ordered all firefighters to evacuate the structure. A few moments later, the entire roof collapsed. Two firefighters were found on the floor of the structure and four others trapped under the roof.  

The Building

The Waldbaum's Supermarket was a 15,000 square foot facility that appears to be a one-story building from the exterior. Inside there was a mezzanine used for offices. The building itself was constructed of masonry bearing walls and a wood-truss roof system. An additional one-story structure was being built as part of the renovation project. The ceiling was a complex structure all to itself of several layers with an interior drop ceiling installed to conceal the original tin ceiling followed by a flat roof supported by timber trusses and an exterior 'rain roof" to assist with drainage and water runoff.

Let us remember

Lt. James E. Cutillo of Battalion 33

Firefighter Charles S. Bouton of Ladder 156

Firefighter Harold F. Hastings of Battalion 42

Firefighter James P. McManus of Ladder 153

Firefighter William O’Connor of Ladder 156

Firefighter George S. Rice of Ladder 153

Remembering Firefighter John Nance

10:10 pm, the Columbus Division of Fire was dispatched to North High Street for a report of

smoke coming from the 1st floor of the Mithoff Building. At 10:12 pm, Engine 1 arrived on the scene

immediately, followed by Engine 9 and Engine 3. Firefighter John Nance was acting Lieutenant on Engine

3.

The Division of Fire used a “battle plan” consisting of two task forces to fight downtown fires.

Acting Lieutenant Nance was with Taskforce two and was staged at the rear of the building. His crew

noticed smoke hanging low to the sidewalk, indicating a basement fire. Nance and his crew from Engine

3 entered the building, joined by teams from Ladder 2 and Engine 2 shortly after. The smoke was so

dense the crews were forced to crawl while advancing the charged hose line.

Approximately 30 minutes into the incident, a second alarm was transmitted. While there was

still no visible fire, the smoke was increasing. Met with a significant amount of smoke and heat, Nance

and his crew continued to search for access to the basement. Unable to access the basement and

quickly exhausted, Nance and his crew vacated the building to cool down and switch out air bottles.

Now, after numerous research attempts, it seems no one knows what happened to Firefighter

John Nance other than he fell through the floor into the basement. A hole was found where he fell

through, leaving firefighters and officials to believe he was cutting a hole to the basement. Firefighters

were attempting to rescue FF Nance utilizing ropes and hose lines. As the fire began to show, Nance had

run out of air. The Assistant Chief started to remove people from the fire. Using a “search rope” type

technique, firefighters once again entered the building in a final attempt to save FF Nance. Firefighters

were again pulled from the building; last attempts were made to gain access to firefighter Nance, but all

turned empty.

Eventually reaching the 4th alarm, the fire was placed under control around 5 am.

Unfortunately, FF Nance did not make it out of the fire, and his body was recovered on the afternoon of

July 26th. According to reports, the building was intentionally set on fire, making this line of duty death a

murder.

As always, a line of duty death results in training tactics for firefighters. This LODD brought us

the “John Nance Drill” or “Hole in the floor.” The drill removes firefighters from a basement should stairs

or easier access not be available. I have attached a link to watch it here

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umzJmtMHrdA this incident also shows the importance of using a

search rope or tag line. Although firefighters had a hose line to follow in this incident, a search rope still

provides an additional tool to help guide a firefighter out and to assist firefighters in to assist a downed

firefighter should anything happen.

I must admit, when looking for my LODD topic this month, I was unaware of John Nance. As I

researched it and found multiple articles and stories, I became a bit obsessed with always looking for

more information. To my knowledge and what I have seen, the murder has yet to be solved, officials and

investigators have found why the building was set on fire but have yet to find out who started it. I found

a story written by Michael Norman on FFprovinggrounds.com. Mr. Norman, a writer for Columbus

Monthly, provides detail on the incident in his write-up. I encourage anyone unfamiliar with this to do

an internet search and read up on it.

**Video link provided by FFprovinggrounds YouTube page**

Remembering the Hackensack Ford Fire

On July 1, 1988, when firefighters of the Hackensack Fire Department arrived on scene of the Ford dealership on River Street in Hackensack, NJ around 3pm, they did not know how deceptive the fire would prove to be. They did not know that five of their fellow firefighters would not be coming home. On the initial alarm, Hackensack firefighters on two engines, one ladder and chief car responded to a reported fire at the Hackensack Ford auto dealership. During fire operations, fire was discovered to be burning above in the truss over the service area and was vented by the truck company on scene. Fire suppression was attempted by both engine companies through two ceiling hatches above the service area. Shortly thereafter, an evacuation order was transmitted over the radio of which were not acknowledged by any of the units working on scene.

Otherwise known as the Hackensack Ford Fire, this fire claimed the lives of five firefighters battling a fire in a bowstring-truss building when the roof suddenly collapsed. Three of the five firefighters lost their lives in the middle of the service area of the dealership. The other two firefighters became trapped in the rear storage room and were unable to be rescued. After approximately 1 hour into the operation, these five firefighter lost their lives and were the first line of duty deaths in the department's 117 year history to that point.

Remember & Honor

Capt. Richard L. Williams (Engine Co. No. 304)

Lt. Richard R. Reinhagen (Engine Co. No. 302)

Firefighter William Krejsa (Engine Co. No. 301)

Firefighter Leonard Radumski (Engine Co. No. 302)

Firefighter Stephen Ennis (Engine Co. No. 308).

34 years later this fire has had significant impact on today's fire service. This fire is one of the most analyzed LODD events in the history of the fire service. Numerous issues were noted from the incident including a breakdown in communications. The findings and observations of this fire are still valid today.

The lessons of this fire has resonated deeply within the fire service across the country. The Hackensack Ford Fire caused the fire service to begin looking at building construction on a more serious level especially when operation in and around truss construction and having the ability to identify construction types and truss. It also highlighted a weak command structure, insufficient and ineffective radio communications along with a lack of portable radios for firefighters and a lack of manpower. These lesson stay true to this day.

In an article published the day after the tragedy, Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos said, “There are only 100 of us in this department, and this is just a small place. In a town like this, these are your friends. These were good men.”

Remembering the Charleston 9

On the evening of June 18, 2007 the City of Charleston, South Carolina experienced the deadliest firefighter disaster in the US since the attacks on September 11, 2001 - The Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire. On this tragic day 9 firefighters perished in the line of duty. 

The incident

The fire occurred at the Sofa Super Store, a 42,000 sq. ft. single-story steel truss showroom with a 17,000 sq. ft. warehouse located behind the retail space, located at 1807 Savannah Highway in Charleston, SC. At the time of the incident, the business was in operation and employees were present on the scene. Within minutes of the alarm, firefighters were arriving on scene from Charleston Fire Department and neighboring departments shortly thereafter.

The initial attack focused on fire suppression in the loading dock area with efforts to prevent fire spread to the showroom and warehouse. Despite the efforts of the firefighters on scene, the fire spread into and above the main showroom, the right showroom addition and the warehouse. The burning furniture quickly generated large amounts of toxic and highly flammable gasses and products of incomplete combustion that added to the fuel load inside the structure.  As heat intensified, interior firefighters began to radio for assistance leaving one firefighter to activate his emergency button on his radio. The front showroom windows were knocked out as firefighters were sent in to search for the missing firefighters. Shortly after, the mixture of combustible by-products ignited, rapidly advancing fire to the main showroom. The Sofa Super Store had no sprinkler system. Flames weakened the structure, causing a collapse and trapping nine firefighters inside.

The land that once housed the Sofa Super Store was purchased by the City of Charleston and is now a park that houses memorial plaques in remembrance of the nine firefighters who lost their lives on that site on June 18, 2007.

The nine firefighters who lost their lives on June 18, 2007.

Captain Louis Mulkey - Engine 15

Captain Mike Benke - Engine 16

Firefighter Melvin Champaign - Engine 16

Captain William "Billy" Hutchinson - Engine 19

Engineer Bradford "Brad" Baity - Engine 19

Firefighter James "Earl" Drayton - Engine 19

Engineer Mark Kelsey - Tower 5

Engineer Michael French - Tower 5

Firefighter Brandon Thompson - Tower 5 

The lessons that day has changed the fire service as a whole for the better. My recommendation to everyone on this is simple. Read the reports of line of duty incidents. Learn from the actions taken that day, a long with the findings and recommendations put forth after the investigations are complete.

Here are a few initial changes recommended from the Sofa Super Store fire. The full list of recommended changes can be found here: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200718.html

• Develop, implement and enforce a written SOPs for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 5000

• Develop, implement and enforce a written Incident Management System (IMS) to be followed at all emergency operations

• Ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior firefighting operations

• Train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates

• Ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents

• Ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander

• Train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure

• Ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021

We can post pictures saying "never forget" and "always remembered", however that isn't enough for these firefighters or any firefighter who loses their life in the line of duty. Each man and woman leaves behind a family, friends and those they cared for and those who cared for them. Simply saying we never forget truly isn't enough. Honoring them each and every day is how we show them the respect and honor for what they've done. Wake up each day honoring and remembering these firefighters through your action. Continue improving, learning and paying it forward to those around you. Take the lessons they left you from that day and learn from it. Pass these lessons on to future generations of firefighters and keep their memory alive in all you do. 

To the family, friends and surviving members of the Charleston Fire Department and the City of Charleston, may these men never be forgotten and may they always rest in peace.

Remembering the Fathers Day Fire

On June 17th, 2001, FDNY units were dispatched to a reported fire at 15-22 Astoria Blvd. Crews arrived on the scene and found an active fire in the basement of the Long Island General Supply Store. For approximately 30 minutes, firefighters were operating with no issues until witnesses described a "small explosion" followed by a blast. Firefighters were venting the building on the #1 side during the blast; the wall came down, trapping them. The Chief on scene transmitted additional alarms for extra manpower to assist with operations and digging through the rubble. During that time, firefighter Brian Fahey had a radio transmission, reporting he was trapped in the basement under debris from the collapse. Firefighters were able to free firefighters Harry Ford and John Downing, who were transported to the hospital but unfortunately succumbed to their injuries. Crews continued an extensive operation to get to firefighter Brian Fahey; unfortunately, he too had passed. The fire was being fueled by flammables in the basement, including an illegally stored propane tank, which caused the blast. Due to 9/11 happening in the same year, the father's day fire is often referred to as the "forgotten fire," but to the companies and families affected, it is undoubtedly remembered.

We must not forget how important these fires are to the fire service. Each fire that ends in tragedy can often provide tips for the future of the fire service. It's not to say incident commanders or firefighters were making bad decisions at present; we just learned how operations could run better and prevent future tragedies. Here are some points to remember from this fire and all fires.

Communication – This is one of the easiest ways to make operations more manageable, and it's often overlooked and not done enough. Whether it's engine and truck companies coordinating their tasks or a firefighter breaking away from his crew to search an area, communications should happen.

Preplans – Preplans should not only be created for your first due area but should often be updated. A preplan is a great way to keep an organized command system on scenes, almost as if you're following a script. Preplans don't have to stop with operations. They can also consist of hazards of certain buildings. Often, if you reach out to the building manager, they'll provide you with the info needed and be willing to assist in making operations more manageable.

Building Codes – Municipalities or departments that handle building and fire codes should keep up to date on structures in their area to ensure laws are being followed. Often firefighter injuries or LODDs occur due to occupancies or commercial facilities not following proper codes.

There will never be a way to prevent tragedies from happening; however, if we read, study, and learn from past incidents, it can help the cause.

The Firehouse Tribune remembers fallen FDNY firefighters.

John Downing of Ladder Co. 163

Brian Fahey of Rescue Co. 4

Harry Ford of Rescue Co. 4